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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF 
STATE TAXATION OF INTERNET TRANSACTIONS 
INTRODUCTION  
With the global expansion of the Internet, the business world has found the 
“information superhighway” a very useful tool in marketing and selling their 
products.1 The Internet allows access to new buyers not otherwise purchasing 
goods and services due to geographical constraints.2  With the expanding use 
of the Internet as a business tool for selling products, states have become more 
aggressive in ensuring Internet businesses comply with their tax laws.  This is 
due to several factors.  First, states view the Internet as a new source of tax 
revenue on sales not previously made in the state through other mediums.3  
Next, states are concerned that not taxing the Internet will lead to a large loss 
of revenue as companies change from doing business through catalogs, maga-
zines, and stores to the Internet.4  For these reasons, taxation of Internet trans-
actions is viewed as vital to a state’s interest.5 
States tax purchases through sales and use taxes.6  A levy on privilege of 
using, within taxing state, property purchased outside the state, if the property 
would have been subject to the sales tax had it been purchased at home.  Such 
tax ordinarily serves to complement sales tax by eliminating incentive to make 
 
 1. Wendy R. Leibowitz, Taxman Has Interest In Internet Biz, THE NAT’L L.J., March 16, 
1998, at B1. 
 2. Wendy Grossman, Connected: Why The Net Won’t Deliver World Peace, THE DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 9, 1997, at 10. 
 3. Frank James, Lawmakers Introduce Pre-emptive Bill In Bid To Keep Cyberspace Tax-
free, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1997, at 11. 
 4. Shawn Zeller, The Squabble Over Internet Taxes, THE NAT’L J., Dec. 13, 1997, at 2520. 
 5. Doug Sheppard, League Of Cities Marks Internet Tax Freedom Act for Extinction, 98 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 10, 1998, at 46-5. 
 6. Sales Tax - A state or local level tax on the retail sale of specified property or services.  
It is a percentage of the cost of such.  Generally, the purchaser pays the tax, but the seller collects 
it, as an agent for the government.  Various taxing jurisdictions allow exemptions for purchases 
of specified items, including certain foods, services, and manufacturing equipment.  If the pur-
chaser and seller are in different states, a use tax usually applies.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1339-40 (6th ed. 1990). 
Use tax - A sales tax that is collectible by the seller where the purchaser is domiciled in a differ-
ent state.  A tax on the use, consumption, or storage of tangible property, usually at the same rate 
as the sales tax, and levied for the purpose of preventing tax avoidance by the purchase of articles 
in a state or taxing jurisdiction which does not levy sales tax or has a lower rate. 
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major purchases in states with lower sales taxes; it requires resident who shops 
out-of-state to pay use tax equal to sales tax savings.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1544 (6th ed. 1990).  To impose a use tax on a nonresident pur-
chaser, a state must meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause and the 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.7  To meet the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause, a person or entity must have “minimum con-
tacts” with the taxing jurisdiction.8  To meet the requirements of the Com-
merce Clause, (1) a person or entity must have “a sufficient nexus” with the 
taxing jurisdiction; (2) the tax must be fairly apportioned; (3) the tax must not 
discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) the tax must be fairly related 
to services provided by the state.9  Due to differing interpretations of “mini-
mum contacts” and “sufficient nexus”, especially in light of the recent case of 
Quill v. North Dakota,10 there is significant controversy as to whether states 
can tax nonresident purchasers of goods and services through the Internet.11 
For this reason, legislation called the “Internet Tax Freedom Act”, has re-
cently been passed which imposes a three year moratorium on all state and lo-
cal taxation of Internet transactions.12  Congress asserts it has jurisdiction to 
impose this ban, under Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution,13 
because the Internet is inherently a matter of interstate commerce.14  Congress 
also asserts there is a need for this legislation due to state and local govern-
ments imposing “inconsistent and inadministrable” taxes on Internet transac-
tions.15  Congress asserts that a single transaction could be subject to more than 
30,000 taxing jurisdictions throughout the United States.16 
States argue that a moratorium on state and local taxation of the Internet 
would violate their 10th Amendment rights,17 as defined in the recent cases of 
United States v. Lopez18 and New York v. United States.19  The states argue that 
 
 7. Nat’l. Bella Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756-57 (1967). 
 8. Miller Bros. Co. v. Md., 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954). 
 9. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 10. Quill Corp. v. N.D., 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 11. Doug Sheppard, Proposed Internet Act a Natural for Debate at Electronic Commerce 
Seminar, 14 STATE TAX NOTES, Feb. 9, 1998, at 455. 
 12. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277 (Title XI of the Omnibus Consolidated 
and Emergency Appropriations Act of 1998). 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Authorizes the Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes[.]”). 
 14. H.R. 4328, at § 2(1); S. 442 at § 2(1). 
 15. H.R. 4328, at § 2(4); S. 442, at § 2(4). 
 16. H.R. 4328, at § 2(7); S. 442 at § 2(7). 
 17. Doug Sheppard, National League of Cities Airs Concerns About Proposed Internet Act, 
14 STATE TAX NOTES, Jan. 26, 1998, at 271. 
 18. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1994)( In Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 
U.S.C. §922(2)(1)(A) (1988), Congress made it a federal offense to possess a firearm in a school 
zone). 
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a moratorium on state and local taxation of the Internet would invade the rights 
of the states to perform one of their basic functions as states, to raise revenue 
to fund state functions.20 
This Comment will examine why Congress became involved in state and 
local taxation of the Internet and the constitutional issues involved with federal 
preemption of state taxation of the Internet.  First, the history of the Internet 
will be discussed.  Second, this comment will address the constitutional issues 
involved with Internet taxation under the Due Process Clause and the Com-
merce Clause.  Third, arguments for and against preemption of state and local 
taxation of the Internet will be set forth.  Finally, this Comment will advocate 
why the “Internet Tax Freedom Act” is an invalid use of congressional power 
to preempt state taxation of the Internet. 
HISTORY OF THE INTERNET 
The Internet began with early research on packet switch networks and a 
computer system called ARPANET.21  The first ARPANET system, which was 
intended for use in the Department of Defense, linked four computer systems 
together in 1969.22  In 1972, electronic mail was introduced to the system and 
the innovation of an “open-architecture” system was introduced which would 
allow each computer to stand on its own and interact with the Internet.23  In the 
early 1980’s, the Internet was introduced to vendors for use by the public and 
the first Internet user workshop took place in 1985.24  The “World Wide Web” 
was created in 1994.25  From then on, the Internet has grown almost exponen-
tially, with an estimated 19,500,000 host sites in July 199726 and 40-60 million 
users.27  Internet sales in 1997 were estimated to be $8 billion.28  Additionally, 
it is estimated that sales in the year 2000 will be $220 billion.29  The Internet is 
the most visible symbol of multimedia; including video, data, and audio trans-
 
 19. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)(In the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1942, 42 U.S.C. § 2021), Congress 
asserted authority under Commerce Clause to regulate state disposal of radioactive waste). 
 20. See Sheppard, supra note 5. 
 21. BARRY M. LEINER, ET. AL., A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET, 1 (1997)(See 
http://www.isoc.org/internet-history). 
 22. Id. at 3. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 12. 
 25. See LEINER, supra note 21 at 14. 
 26. NETWORK WIZARDS, INTERNET DOMAIN SURVEY (July 1997)(See 
http://www.nw.com/zone/WWW/report.html). 
 27. See Leslie Miller, Net Surfers Becoming More Mainstream, Survey Shows, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 14, 1996, at D1; Leslie Miller, 1 in 4 Now Using the Net, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 1997, at 
1A. 
 28. See Leibowitz, supra note 1. 
 29. See Leibowitz, supra note 1. 
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missions over one pathway to a user.30  The Internet is a high-speed network of 
computers linked by wireless systems to virtually anywhere in the world.31  
With this expansive growth and the ability to reach new users, the Internet has 
much potential for different uses in the business world. 
For these many different reasons, and due to the dramatic increase in the 
use of the Internet for businesses, the issue of state taxation of transactions 
over the Internet has become a very hot topic in recent politics.32 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM WITH STATE TAXATION OF THE 
INTERNET 
A use tax reaches sales made outside state borders, by resident purchasers, 
where a sales tax cannot be imposed.33  A use tax puts in-state and out-of-state 
sellers on a level playing field by imposing an equal tax on equivalent transac-
tions.34  However, to impose a use tax, states must meet standards prescribed 
by the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution.35  Several recent United States Supreme Court cases have set the 
requirements to comply with these standards.36 
To comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, a taxpayer 
must have “minimum contacts” with the taxing jurisdiction.37 Minimum con-
tacts require “some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state 
and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax”.38  Applying the princi-
ples of Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the 
Supreme Court has held that if any foreign corporation purposefully avails it-
self of the benefits of a forum state, “it may subject itself to the state’s in per-
sonam jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in the state”.39  Under 
this test, the Due Process Clause is not the issue in taxation of the Internet. 
In order to comply with the requirements of the Commerce Clause, the test 
set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,40 as clarified in the recent 
case of Quill,41 must be met.  Complete Auto established a four-prong test for 
 
 30. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (1997) (for definition of the Internet); see also Edmund Lee, 
Cyber-Whaa?, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 21, 1997, at 24; LEINER, supra note 21. 
 31. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (1997). 
 32. See Sheppard, supra note 5. 
 33. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1544 (6th ed. 1990). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Nat’l Bella Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 756-57. 
 36. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 298; see also Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989); Oklahoma 
Tax Comm’n. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995). 
 37. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 38. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344-45. 
 39. 504 U.S. at 307-08. 
 40. 430 U.S. at 274. 
 41. 504 U.S. at 298. 
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deciding whether a state use tax meets or violates the Commerce Clause.42  
This test requires a tax to meet the following four requirements to be valid un-
der the Commerce Clause: “(1) the tax is applied to an activity with a “substan-
tial nexus” with the taxing state; (2) the tax is fairly apportioned; (3) the tax 
does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) the tax is fairly re-
lated to the services provided by the state.”43  Due to differing concerns of the 
Commerce Clause,44 the Commerce Clause test has been interpreted to be a 
more comprehensive test than that of the Due Process Clause.45 Taxation of the 
Internet is concerned with whether or not a business that has no contact with 
the state, except through the use of the Internet, is subject to a duty to collect 
and pay taxes.46  In determining this, the two tests set forth above for the Due 
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause are the determining factors. 
A “BRIGHT-LINE” RULE IS SET 
The requirement for “physical presence” to acquire a “substantial nexus” 
under the Commerce Clause was first expressed in National Bella Hess, Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue of Illinois.47  This case held that it was unconstitutional 
for any state to impose a use tax collection duty on a seller whose only connec-
tion with customers in the taxing state was by common carrier or mail.48 
Later, in Quill v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court held that the rule of 
National Bella Hess, Inc. was still valid when it held it is unconstitutional to 
impose a tax collection obligation on an out-of-state mail-order house with no 
“physical presence” in the taxing state.49  In Quill, the taxpayer was a Dela-
ware corporation with offices and warehouses in Illinois, California, and Geor-
gia.50  Quill sold office equipment and supplies through catalogs and flyers and 
had sales of $1 million in North Dakota to 3000 customers.51  It delivered all of 
its orders via mail or common carrier from out-of-state locations.52 
The Court found that the taxpayer, Quill, had met the requirements of the 
Due Process Clause since it had “purposely directed” its activities at North 
 
 42. 430 U.S. at 279. 
 43. Id. 
 44. 504 U.S. at 312 (the Commerce Clause is concerned with state regulation of the national 
economy to secure a national market unimpeded by state-imposed burdens across state lines). 
 45. Id. at 312-13. 
 46. See generally Dave Lesher, Political Odd Couple Back Internet Tax Ban, L.A. TIMES, 
June 9, 1997, at A3. 
 47. 386 U.S. at 758. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 504 U.S. at 312. 
 50. Id. at 302. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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Dakota.53  But the Court also found that, for purposes of the Commerce 
Clause, Quill did not have a “sufficient nexus” with North Dakota since the 
test for nexus was narrower than the minimum contacts test for the Due Pro-
cess Clause.54  The Court held that “physical presence” was needed to impose 
a duty of taxation upon an entity.55  Since Quill had no offices, warehouses, or 
employees in North Dakota, and it had no other physical presence in the state, 
it was not subject to a use tax collection duty.56  The Court held that a common 
carrier or the mail system does not give a taxpayer the “physical presence” 
needed to be subject to a use tax collection duty.57 
Quill sets forth a bright-line “physical presence” requirement before a state 
can impose a duty on an out-of-state business to collect use taxes on sales.58  
But the fundamental issue Quill does not answer for purposes of taxing the In-
ternet, is “What is considered physical presence?”.  Does having computers in 
a state give a taxpayer sufficient nexus?  Does using a service provider (which 
would be considered a taxpayer’s agent) for Internet services give a taxpayer 
nexus with a state?  Service providers, such as “CompuServe, Inc.”, have 
mainframes and computer systems in every state.59  Therefore, does this mean 
since a business has an Internet services contract with a provider this gives the 
business a “sufficient nexus” in a state? 
NEXUS BY AGENCY 
In the first case to set forth a possible end run around the “physical pres-
ence” test of Quill, the Supreme Court held that an out-of-state mail-order sell-
er did have sufficient contacts with the state of California, through an agent, to 
be subject to a use tax collection duty.60  In National Geographic Society, a 
nonprofit scientific and educational corporation maintained two offices in Cali-
fornia that made solicitations for the company’s magazine.61  However the of-
fices performed no activities related to the separate mail-order business.62  All 
orders were mailed from California to the Washington, D.C. office and the 
magazines were delivered by mail.63  California asserted that the offices were 
enough to provide a nexus between the out-of-state seller and the state to im-
 
 53. 504 U.S. at 312. 
 54. Id. at 312-13. 
 55. Id. at 314. 
 56. Id. at 301-02. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 504 U.S. at 314-18. 
 59. State Should Be Able To Tax On-Line Computer Services, MTC Official Says, 118 BNA 
DAILY TAX REPORTS, June 20, 1995, at D3 [hereinafter State Should Be Able]. 
 60. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 562 (1977). 
 61. Id. at 552. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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pose use tax collection liability.64  The society argued its only contacts were by 
means of a common carrier or the mail and that the offices played no part in its 
mail-order activities.65  Therefore, they asserted they did not have enough 
presence to allow the state to impose use tax collection liability on them.66 
The Court held that the requisite nexus was present since the out-of-state 
sales were arranged by the society’s in-state local agents.67  The Court held 
that a “slight presence” would not be enough to allow a state to impose a col-
lection obligation, but the maintenance of a continuous relationship with the 
state constituted a sufficient nexus to allow the imposition of a use tax collec-
tion obligation.68  Among the many cases cited by the Court for their “agency 
theory” of nexus were Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,69 Standard Pressed Steel v. 
Washington Revenue Department,70 Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co. v. De-
partment of Revenue of Washington,71 and General Trading Co. v. Tax 
Comm’n. of Iowa.72.73  These cases all found a sufficient nexus with a state 
through the connections of agents.  In fact, in Standard Pressed Steel, the Court 
found a sufficient nexus merely through one employee in a state.74 
In the application of this theory to the world of the Internet, the states can 
assert a broad interpretation of what constitutes a sufficient nexus through an 
agent.  States can apply the agency theory through commercial online services 
to find a sufficient nexus wherever the service provider has computer systems 
providing transmission services to a business on the Internet.  Since the service 
provider is the in-state distributor of information for the business, the state can 
assert that the information services provider is the agent of the business and 
find nexus with almost any state. 
For example, suppose some business contracts with CompuServe, Inc. to 
provide Internet services for their company and CompuServe, Inc. has loca-
tions in all fifty states.75  Since the Internet does not have barriers, the infor-
mation on the webpage is transmitted to all fifty states via CompuServe com-
 
 64. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 430 U.S. at 553-54. 
 65. Id. at 560. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 556. 
 68. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 430 U.S. at 556. 
 69. 362 U.S. 207 (1960)(holding that a corporation without an office or place of business in 
Florida, but with ten broker-agents who solicited sales, had nexus with the state). 
 70. 419 U.S. 560 (1975)(holding a business with one home-based employee in the taxing 
state, has nexus with the state). 
 71. 306 U.S. 62 (1939)(holding a business which has office or employees in the taxing state, 
but has agents that solicite orders within the state, has nexus with the state). 
 72. 322 U.S. 335 (1944)(holding a Minnesota corporation solicited business in Iowa, with no 
other contacts with the taxing state, has nexus with the state). 
 73. 430 U.S. at 556-57. 
 74. 419 U.S. at 562. 
 75. State Should Be Able, supra note 59, at D3. 
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puter systems.  Subsequently, one customer in each of the fifty states buys a 
product from the business which is shipped via a common carrier.  Through the 
agency theory of nexus, CompuServe physical presence through computer sys-
tems in all fifty states would allow all states to assert a duty on the business to 
collect use taxes.  This would be the result despite the fact that the business has 
no other contacts with the state other than the one customer. 
As indicated above, the use of the agency theory of nexus allows for al-
most unlimited liability for any communications over the Internet and imposes 
liability for use taxes on any online company. 
NEXUS THROUGH DELIVERY 
The most important case in favor of the states’ efforts to tax Internet trans-
actions is Goldberg v. Sweet.76  In Goldberg, the question was whether taxation 
of a telephone call that originated or terminated in a state, and was charged to 
an in-state billing address and telephone number, was contrary to the Complete 
Auto test.77 
The Supreme Court relied mostly on the fair apportionment prong of the 
Complete Auto test in its opinion which requires a tax to be both internally and 
externally consistent.78  To be externally consistent, a state must only tax that 
portion of revenue that reflects the in-state component of the activity.79  To be 
internally consistent, a tax must be structured so that if every state were to im-
pose an identical tax, no multiple taxation would result.80 
The Court referred to the nexus issue and expressed doubt as to whether a 
sufficient nexus to tax a call existed in states through which the electronic sig-
nal of the telephone call traveled.81  The Court found only two states had a suf-
ficient nexus to tax the call: the originating state and the delivery state.  This 
nexus only existed when the call was charged to a service address within the 
state of origin.82  Therefore, the Court concluded the risk of unfair apportion-
ment was virtually nonexistent since there was the presence of a credit for tax-
es paid to other states.83 
Therefore, in the context of nexus, Goldberg stands for the proposition that 
any state has a substantial nexus to tax a transaction where (1) the service orig-
inates or terminates in the state; and (2) the service is charged to an address 
 
 76. 488 U.S. 252 (1989). 
 77. Id. at 257. 
 78. Id. at 261. 
 79. Id. at 262. 
 80. 488 U.S. at 261. 
 81. Id. at 262-63. 
 82. Id. at 263. 
 83. Id. at 263-64. 
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within the state.84  This theory of nexus can be called “nexus through deliv-
ery”.85 
Another case which uses the test set forth in Goldberg is Oklahoma Tax 
Comm’n. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.86  In Jefferson Lines, a common carrier did 
not collect a state sales tax on bus tickets sold in Oklahoma for interstate travel 
originating in Oklahoma.87  The state of Oklahoma asserted a tax was due on 
the entire bus ticket, without apportionment to other states through which the 
bus traveled.88 
The Supreme Court held the tax constitutional under the Commerce Clause 
by concluding that there was no risk of multiple taxation by other states since 
the sale had taken place in Oklahoma.89  The Court cited Goldberg holding that 
the state in which the sale is consummated is the state which has the necessary 
nexus to collect a tax on the transaction.90  Therefore, the Court relied on the 
nexus prong of the Complete Auto test in finding that a sales tax on interstate 
transportation, although unapportioned, which is paid at the point of origina-
tion is constitutional.91  Again, the Court used a two-part test in finding a sub-
stantial nexus.92  First, there must be a billing address in the state of origina-
tion.93  Second, the service must originate or terminate in that state.94 
In the context of the Internet, the Goldberg standard sets forth a useful test 
to determine whether a state has a sufficient nexus to allow taxation of a trans-
action by the state.  Under the Goldberg test, a billing address would be re-
quired.95  Since businesses providing goods or services via the Internet could 
always require a billing address before those services or products are provided 
to a customer this element is easily met.  Many businesses providing goods and 
services over the Internet already require the customer to provide some sort of 
identification for billing purposes, i.e. credit verification.  This would be no 
different if an additional use tax is collected as part of the consideration paid at 
the time of a transaction. 
Credit cards are the main method of payment on the Internet.  During a 
transaction, the customer gives the company the credit card information and 
 
 84. 488 U.S. at 263. 
 85. Scot R. Grierson, Sales and Use Tax Nexus On The Information Superhighway: Consti-
tutional Limits, 70 TAX NOTES 1683, 1689 (1996). 
 86. 514 U.S. 175 (1995). 
 87. Id. at 178. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 184. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 514 U.S. at 184-85. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 263-63. 
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authorization to charge the card in exchange for goods or services provided in 
the future.  At the same time, the company can request the required infor-
mation for payment of an applicable sale or use tax.  Therefore, the transaction 
would meet the first part of the Goldberg test. 
Next, under the Goldberg test only two states would have a possible taxa-
ble nexus with the business.  These are the state where the transmission begins 
(business location) and the state where the transmission ends (customer).  In 
the case of the Internet, the tax would be paid to the state in which the sale oc-
curred, i.e., the customer’s state.  Since the tax would only allow for payment 
for that portion of the tax attributable to the in-state transaction, the tax would 
meet the Commerce Clause test. 
Therefore, if the Goldberg test is used for the Commerce Clause, a use tax 
on Internet transactions would be constitutional and would be workable to en-
sure businesses carry out their obligations to collect use taxes due a state. 
THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE 10TH 
AMENDMENT 
Federal preemption96 involves the Commerce Clause which delegates the 
power to Congress to regulate commerce among the several states.97  The de-
velopment of congressional power to preempt a field also has intertwined with-
in it the development of 10th Amendment jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court resurrected the 10th Amendment in 1976 in National 
League of Cities v. Usery.98  The Court held the application of minimum wage 
and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local gov-
ernment employees violated the 10th Amendment.99  The Court struck down 
Congress’ exercise of its Commerce Clause powers and declared invalid the 
Congressional attempt to regulate “States as States”.100  National League of 
Cities represented a resurrection of the 10th Amendment’s capacity to set lim-
its on congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 
The holding in National League of Cities gradually eroded.  The erosion 
began in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n.101 where the 
Court rejected a 10th Amendment challenge to the Surface Mining Control and 
 
 96. Federal Preemption - The U.S. Constitution and acts of Congress have given to the fed-
eral government exclusive power over certain matters such as interstate commerce and sedition to 
the exclusion of state jurisdiction.  Occurs when federal law so occupies the field that state courts 
are prevented from asserting jurisdiction.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990). 
 97. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (Authorizes the Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes[.]”). 
 98. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 99. Id. at 851-52. 
 100. 426 U.S. at 845. 
 101. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
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Reclamation Act of 1977.102  This Act created a federal regulatory scheme for 
surface mining on nonfederal lands.103  The Court held that for legislation to 
come under the protection of the National League of Cities proscription three 
requirements must be met.104  First, there must be a showing that the statute 
regulates the “States as States”.105  Second, federal regulation must address 
matters that are “attributes of state sovereignty”.106  Third, it must be apparent 
that compliance with federal law would directly impair states’ ability “to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional government functions”.107  The 
Court found that the federal statute did not regulate “States as States” and that 
the federal statute only regulated private individuals’ activities on their 
lands.108 
Another case further curtailed the holding in National League of Cities, 
FERC v. Mississippi,109 a case that involved regulation of public utilities, tradi-
tionally an area of state concern.110  The Court held that utility rates affect in-
terstate commerce and, therefore, congressional regulation of rates was proper-
ly within the Commerce Clause.111  The Court also held the states’ 10th 
Amendment challenge was preempted by Congress.  This was so because the 
requirement that state agencies follow federally created standards was only a 
condition to continuing state involvement in those areas subject to federal 
preemption.112 
In EEOC v. Wyoming,113 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was 
raised as a defense to Wyoming’s law requiring mandatory retirement for park 
rangers at age 55.114  The Court held the federal act was a valid exercise of 
Congress’ Commerce Clause powers.115  The Act satisfied the first prong of 
the Hodel test by regulating “States as States”.116  Skipping the second prong, 
the Court found that the Act did not directly impair Wyoming’s ability to struc-
ture internal operations in areas of traditional government function.117  There-
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fore, the Court upheld the Act as a valid use of the Commerce Clause by Con-
gress.118 
National League of Cities119 was finally overruled in Garcia v. San Anto-
nio Metropolitan Transit Authority.120  This case allowed the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to be applied to state and local government employees.121  In 
Garcia, the Court found Hodel’s three prong test to be unworkable.122  Particu-
larly, they found the third prong of the test, requiring a finding of impairment 
of the state’s ability “to structure internal operations in areas of traditional 
government function”, impossible to apply.123  The Court concluded that what 
constituted “traditional” and “integral” state governmental functions was hard 
to define and that the states’ interests were adequately protected by the national 
political process and Congress.124  Therefore, Garcia expresses the philosophy 
that the 10th Amendment is a statement of political policy without the force of 
an affirmative prohibition on congressional action. 
After Garcia, the Court delineated states’ rights under the 10th Amend-
ment in New York v. United States.125  This case involved  the Low-Level Ra-
dioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, a federal law concerning ra-
dioactive-waste policy.  Specifically, this law forced states to enter into 
regional compacts for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste.126 
Congress’ objective was to force states to develop disposal sites and take 
action for disposal of the waste.127  Congress forced compliance through three 
incentives.128  The first incentive was monetary, and allowed states to impose a 
surcharge on waste received from other states.129  The second incentive permit-
ted states to impose additional surcharges and ultimately deny access to sites 
within their borders when other states failed to comply with the federal man-
dates.130  The third incentive was a “take title” provision that required states 
not in compliance with the federal mandate to take title to waste generated 
within their state and thereby become liable as the owner.131 
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The Court held the “take title” incentive a violation of the 10th Amend-
ment.132  The Court found the framers chose a Constitution that conferred upon 
Congress only the power to regulate individuals, not states.133  The Court 
found Congress lacked the power to require states to enact and enforce a feder-
al regulatory program.134  Therefore, this coercive remedy was unconstitutional 
and an unacceptable exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power to regu-
late interstate commerce.135  New York is a landmark decision because it is the 
first time the 10th Amendment was held to limit federal action under the 
Commerce Clause since National League of Cities.   
Several years after New York, the Court decided United v. Lopez,136 which 
concerned a federal statute criminalizing possession of a firearm within a 
school zone under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.137  The Court held 
the statute invalid since it regulated conduct with an insignificant connection 
with interstate commerce.138  The Court found that “the possession of a gun in 
a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through rep-
etition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce”.139 
Lopez was the first invalidation of a federal statute that regulated private 
conduct.  The Court, in Lopez and New York, curbed erosion of state powers by 
halting the expansion of Commerce Clause powers by Congress.  The majority 
opinion in Lopez reaffirmed Congressional power under the Commerce Clause 
in three areas: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce; and (3) those activities having a “substantial relation” to 
interstate commerce.140 
The most recent case concerning Congress’ ability to compel states to act 
is Printz v. United States.141  This case concerned the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act, which required the Attorney General to establish a national 
system for instant background checks of prospective handgun purchasers.142  
The Act commanded the “chief law enforcement officer” of each local jurisdic-
tion to conduct background checks, in the interim, until a national system was 
operative.143 
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The petitioners in Printz filed actions challenging the Act’s constitutionali-
ty concerning the requirement for states to provide background checks under 
federal mandate until a federal system could be developed.144  The Court held 
the interim provision commanding the states to conduct background checks 
was unconstitutional.145  The Court concluded that the historical understanding 
and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and the Court’s jurisprudence 
contained no evidence that the federal government could command the state, in 
the absence of a specific constitutional provision, to act under the direction of 
Congress.146  The Court found the structure of the Constitution revealed a prin-
ciple establishing a system of “dual sovereignty”.147  They concluded the states 
retained a residual and inviolable sovereignty reflected throughout the text of 
the Constitution. 148 The Court also found the Brady Act’s mandate that state 
officials enforce federal law constitutionally invalid, under Article I, Section 8, 
as a law “necessary and proper”149 to the execution of Congress’ Commerce 
Clause power.150  In reference to New York v. United States, the Court held that 
a law which violates a state’s sovereignty is not a law “proper for carrying into 
execution” powers delegated within the Necessary and Proper Clause.151 
Finally, the Court held the federal government may not compel the states 
to enact or administer a federal regulatory program, since the federal govern-
ment was compromising the structural framework of “dual sovereignty”.152  
This statement was made in reference to the Court’s opinion in New York.153  
Printz only directed state law enforcement officers to participate in the federal 
regulatory scheme temporarily,154 but the Court found this  temporary mandate 
unconstitutional.155 
These cases demonstrate that Congress should not be allowed to preempt 
state and local taxation of the Internet, even through a temporary moratorium, 
due to 10th Amendment and Commerce Clause concerns. 
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FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND CYBERSPACE 
As the Supreme Court stated in Printz, “federal commandeering of state 
governments is such a novel pheonomenom that this court’s first experience 
with it did not occur until the 1970’s”.156  In the case of the Internet, Congress 
wants to compel the states to implement, by legislative or executive action, a 
federal regulatory program which would prohibit all taxation of the Internet for 
a proscribed period of at least three years.157 
As seen in New York and Printz, a federal regulatory scheme which com-
mands state agencies to enforce federal law, such as refusing to tax Internet 
transactions, is prohibited by the 10th Amendment and current Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.  This is the case even though the prohibition is tempo-
rary.  In Printz, the local implementation of federal law was to persist for a 
shorter period than the three year term currently in the Internet Tax Freedom 
Act. 
In Printz, the government’s brief even admitted the constitutional line is 
crossed when Congress compels states to make law in their sovereign capaci-
ties.158  To preempt state taxation and the states’ ability to raise revenue for the 
activities of the government goes directly to the core of state sovereignty.  
Whether the old test, under National League of Cities, or the new law found in 
Garcia, New York, and Printz is employed, it is unconstitutional to curb a 
state’s ability to tax transactions that have a nexus with the state. 
Another argument against preemption of state taxation of the Internet is 
that under the current state and local tax systems,  states allow credits for taxes 
paid to other states.  Although state tax systems compute the liability different-
ly, they meet the Complete Auto test for internal and external consistency and 
would not allow taxes to be paid in two states on the same transaction.  The 
states allow for apportionment of the tax base among the states, which would 
lead to an allocation of taxable income to each state based upon the required 
nexus.  Therefore, double taxation is not a reasonable argument in favor of the 
Internet Tax Freedom Act. 
Finally, under Goldberg, a usable standard has already been set forth by 
the Supreme Court which allows taxation of a transaction in the state in which 
the billing address is situated and the goods or services are delivered.  To com-
ply with Goldberg, when companies are paid they must request the necessary 
information to verify the source of the income and the required state for pay-
ment of the sales or use tax.  In this way, the company would have the neces-
sary information to fulfill its obligation for collection and payment of use taxes 
to the applicable state. 
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As the Court stated in Jefferson Lines, “it has long been settled that the sale 
of tangible goods has a sufficient nexus to the state in which the sale is con-
summated to be treated as a local transaction, taxable by that state”.159  So in 
addressing the interstate providing of services, the Court recently held that a 
state in which an interstate telephone call originates or terminates establishes 
the requisite Commerce Clause nexus to tax a customer’s purchase of that call, 
as long as the call is charged or billed to a service address, or paid by the ad-
dressee, within the taxing state.160  Therefore, Internet services would be no 
different from an interstate telephone call for which the Court explicitly found 
in Jefferson Lines that a useable test is available.  In that case the Court stated: 
“Although our decisional law on sales of services is less developed than on 
sales of goods, one category of cases dealing with taxation of gross sales re-
ceipts in the hands of a seller of services supports the view that the taxable 
event is wholly local.  Thus we have held that the entire gross receipts derived 
from sales of services to be performed wholly in one State are taxable by that 
State, notwithstanding that the contract for performance of the services had 
been entered into across state lines with customers who reside outside the tax-
ing State.”.161 
Thus, the Court states that multiple taxation cannot occur because the tax-
able event, i.e., agreement, payment, and delivery of the services, can only oc-
cur in one state.  Therefore, in the case of an information service provider, i.e., 
the Internet, which uses telecommunications, the extension of the Goldberg 
analysis is appropriate. 
Jefferson Lines and Goldberg set forth a usable test requiring the seller of 
goods or services to consumers to acquire nexus with the consumer’s home 
state, through a billing address, since that is where the goods or services are 
purchased. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the analysis of the Court’s holdings in Goldberg and Jefferson 
Lines, an appropriate test has been set forth by the Court for use with the Inter-
net in determining whether or not a state established the necessary nexus to 
compel collection of a use tax by those providing goods or services to custom-
ers within the state. 
Since this test is available, and based upon the Court’s Commerce Clause 
and 10th Amendment jurisprudence, Congress cannot preempt the field of state 
sales and use taxation of the Internet and compel the states, or local jurisdic-
tions, to not tax transactions with the requisite nexus. 
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This is true even though the Internet Tax Freedom Act is only a three year 
moratorium on state and local taxation of the Internet.  Based on Printz, any 
unconstitutional use of Commerce Clause power through a state mandate is 
prohibited, whether it be permanent or temporary.  Therefore, the attempt by 
Congress to preempt taxation of the Internet, by use of the Internet Tax Free-
dom Act, is an unconstitutional use of the Commerce Clause power and a vio-
lation of the states’ 10th Amendment rights. 
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